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Reactivation of long-term memory can render the memory item temporarily labile, offering
an opportunity to modify it via behavioral or pharmacological intervention. Declarative
memory reactivation is accompanied by a metamemory ability to subjectively assess the
knowledge available concerning the target item (Feeling of knowing, FOK). We set out to
examine whether FOK can predict the extent of change of long-term episodic memories
by post-retrieval manipulations. To this end, participants watched a short movie and were
immediately thereafter tested on their memory for it. A day later, they were reminded
of that movie, and either immediately or 1 day later, were presented with a second
movie. The reminder phase consisted of memory cues to which participants were asked to
judge their FOK regarding the original movie. The memory performance of participants to
whom new information was presented immediately after reactivating the original episode
corresponded to the degree of FOK ratings upon reactivation such that the lower their
FOK, the less their memory declined. In contrast, no relation was found between FOK
and memory strength for those who learned new information 1 day after the reminder
phase. Our findings suggest that the subjective accessibility of reactivated memories may
determine the extent to which new information might modify those memories.
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INTRODUCTION
Reactivation of long-term memories renders them transiently
sensitive to potential long-term modifications via behavioral
or pharmacological means in a process termed reconsolidation
(Sara, 2008; Hardt et al., 2010; Dudai, 2012; Schwabe et al.,
2014). This suggests a route to modify established memories,
e.g., enhance desired recall (e.g., Coccoz et al., 2011; Forcato
et al., 2011, 2013), update information (e.g., Forcato et al.,
2007; Hupbach et al., 2007), weaken memories (e.g., Schwabe
and Wolf, 2009; Chan and LaPaglia, 2013), or block intrusive,
traumatic recollections (e.g., Schiller et al., 2010; Agren et al.,
2012; Oyarzun et al., 2012). In recent years, reconsolidation has
been demonstrated in humans for both non-declarative (e.g.,
Walker et al., 2003; Censor et al., 2010; Kindt and Soeter, 2013)
and declarative memory (e.g., Hupbach et al., 2009; Strange
et al., 2010; Kroes et al., 2014). Evidence for alteration of
declarative memories has been shown for verbal memoranda
(Forcato et al., 2007, 2009b), lists of objects or pictures (Hupbach
et al., 2007; Wichert et al., 2011), as well as more naturalis-
tic memories such as movies (Chan and LaPaglia, 2013) and
autobiographical events (Schwabe and Wolf, 2009; Kroes et al.,
2014). Successfully destabilizing and rewriting the memory trace
was reported to depend on a variety of conditions, among
them the strength of the reactivated memory trace, the applied
post-reminder manipulations, and the way reminders are pre-
sented (Hardt et al., 2010; Alberini, 2011; Schiller and Phelps,
2011).
A unique aspect of declarative memory retrieval is the per-
son’s ability to access in real time knowledge about the retrieval
process (Tulving and Madigan, 1970). This faculty, referred to as
“metamemory,” constitutes the capacity to reflect uponmemories
as they unfold and to evaluate their accuracy. A major metamem-
ory capacity is “Feeling of Knowing” (FOK), referring to one’s
experience regarding the relevant information available for recol-
lection, even if the retrieval attempt ultimately fails (Nelson and
Narens, 1990; Koriat, 1993; Schwartz, 1994). FOK judgments are
suggested to be formed based on the sense of familiarity of the
retrieval cues and the information they target (Reder and Ritter,
1992). According to the accessibility account of FOK (Koriat, 1993,
1994), such judgments are formed on the basis of the vividness,
specificity, and intensity of partial retrieved information, be it
correct or incorrect, implying that FOK may signify the degree
or strength of reactivated memories.
There is evidence to suggest that the intensity of reactivation
influences the retrieved memory’s vulnerability to subsequent
manipulations (Alberini, 2011). Thus, highly reactivated mem-
ories brought about by prolonged exposure to reminders were
shown to be more sensitive to post-reactivated administration
of protein synthesis inhibitors (Suzuki et al., 2004), as well as
memory traces that come to dominate behavior (Eisenberg et al.,
2003). Recent studies in humans suggest that heightened degrees
of memory reactivation, assessed by either subjective recollection
(St. Jacques and Schacter, 2013) or by manipulating trace dom-
inance of spatial memory (Bridge and Voss, 2014), corresponds
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to increased susceptibility to memory update. It is noteworthy
that using memory tests as reactivation cues often enhance the
probed memories (Carpenter et al., 2008; Karpicke and Roediger,
2008) and could render them resistant to post-test interference
(Potts and Shanks, 2012). Conversely, reminders that consist of
partial or contextual memory cues seem to contribute to recon-
solidation of the original memories (Hupbach et al., 2007; Forcato
et al., 2009a). Here we set out to test the hypothesis that the level
of FOK assessment of episodic memory availability corresponds
with the degree of memory change induced by post-retrieval
manipulations.
Toward this end, we devised a protocol wherein participants
watched a short movie episode, immediately followed by a mem-
ory test for items presented in the movie. One day later, imme-
diately after being reminded through a partial retrieval cue of the
movie episode and reporting their FOK for scenes depicted in the
movie, they watched a second, unrelated movie (Manipulation
Group). A separate group viewed the second movie without a
preceding reminder and FOK assessment (No reminder Group).
Still another group watched the second movie 1 day after the
reminder stage, outside of the presumed reconsolidation window
(Delayed Manipulation Group). On day 4, memory for the origi-
nal movie was re-tested in all groups, and a differential memory
performance score (“memory strength”) was calculated, represent-
ing changes in memory performance between the initial and final
memory tests. We find that one’s subjective assessment of mem-
ory availability during retrieval can predict the extent to which
new information acquired immediately thereafter will modulate
those memories. This could provide an immediate, accessible
measure of the effectiveness of post-retrieval manipulations on
the fate of reactivated memories.
METHODS AND MATERIALS
PARTICIPANTS
Seventy seven Hebrew speaking participants (26.4 ± 0.4 years
old, 35 females) were recruited from a database of undergradu-
ate and graduate students at the Weizmann Institute of Science
and the Faculty of Agriculture of the Hebrew University, Rehovot,
Israel. All participants asserted in a written consent form that
they did not suffer from vision or hearing disabilities or learning
and memory disorders. The experimental protocol was approved
by the ethical committee of the Weizmann Institute. Participants
were remunerated on an hourly basis. The participants were
divided arbitrarily into the three experimental groups described
below.
EXPERIMENTAL PROTOCOL
The experimental protocol spanned 4 days, each starting with
written instructions explaining the tasks at hand (see Figure 1 for
experimental scheme). On Day 1, all participants watched one of
two Hebrew speaking documentary films on a computer screen
supplemented with earphones (movie A, 5min, n = 38; movie B,
7min, n = 39). Both films depicted non-dramatic, emotionally
neutral content, and included several scenes within the context
of a central theme. One movie portrayed a news interview with a
martial arts expert, who explained and demonstrated self-defense
techniques. The other movie involved a job interview taken by
two young men, displaying different interviewer prototypes. The
movie (first episode) was presented three times intercalated with
1-min displays of tranquil nature scenes. Five minutes after the
last presentation, memory performance for the learnedmovie was
tested using a computerized questionnaire, in which 40 questions
taxed occurrences of scenes from themovie (test 1). The questions
probed memory for details about specific scenes or characters,
such as: “What does Jeanne take with her to the interview?” or
“What are Joe’s expectations of the proposed job?” Four possi-
ble answers were presented for each question, from which only
one was correct. Responses were provided by clicking A–D on
the keyboard. After replying to each question, participants rated
their confidence level regarding the perceived correctness of their
response by pointing with the computer mouse on a visual-analog
scale (VAS) presented on screen spanning continuously from low
to high with 5 intermediate ticks. No feedback was provided to
participants about their response.
On day 2, a reminder phase was carried out, aiming to reac-
tivate memory for the film presented on day 1. The manner in
which memory reminders are presented may significantly influ-
ence the long-term fate of the probed memories (Hupbach et al.,
2007; Forcato et al., 2009a). It is well established that reactivat-
ing memories by means of memory tests can in fact strengthen
those memories (Carpenter et al., 2008; Karpicke and Roediger,
2008), and block the influence of immediate interference (Potts
and Shanks, 2012). Since our aim was reactivating the origi-
nal memories without strengthening them, we built on previous
reconsolidation studies that during the reminder phase exposed
participants to partial retrieval cues (Forcato et al., 2007, 2009a,b;
Hupbach et al., 2007), which possibly promote memory labiliza-
tion by preventing the reinforcement of retrieved information
(Pedreira et al., 2004; Forcato et al., 2009a). We thus chose to
reactivate the learned films by providing textual instructions that
served as general retrieval cues (Mendelsohn et al., 2008, 2009,
2010), followed by instructions to rate FOK levels of the retrieval
attempt on a continuous VAS. The textual reminder cues included
20 sentences that were presented on screen, each referring to a
selected occurrence from the movie presented on day 1. Unlike
the memory test questions administered on day 1, which taxed
specific details from particular scenes, each of the 20 reminder
cues consisted of an instruction to recollect large sections from
themovie, for example—“Please recollect the dialogue conducted
during the interview scenes,” “Please recall the explanations about
the various martial-art techniques shown in the film.” Each such
sentence was presented for 20 s, during which participants were
instructed to retrieve as much information as possible regarding
the targeted scenes. For each reminder cue, they were prompted to
self-appraise their FOK of the targeted occurrences on a continu-
ous VAS with 5 intermediate ticks spanning from low to high FOK
values, which were later translated to a scale of 0 (lowest rating)
to 100 (highest rating).
Either 5min after the reminder session (Manipulation Group,
n= 34, 16 females) or without a preceding reminder (No
Reminder Group, n = 20, 9 females) or a day later (Delayed
Manipulation Group, n = 23, 10 females), participants watched
a second short movie (second episode, movie B for those who
watched movie A on day 1 and viceversa), in the same context as
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FIGURE 1 | Experimental design. Participants from all three groups watched
a movie (movie 1) and were subsequently tested on their memory of it (test
1). On day 2, participants of the Manipulation and Delayed Manipulation
Groups were provided with reminders regarding scenes from movie 1, to
which they were asked to rate their feeling of knowing (FOK). Immediately
after the reminder phase (Manipulation Group) or on day 3 (Delayed
Manipulation Groups) or devoid of the reminder (No Reminder Group)
participants were presented with a second movie (movie 2) and tested on it.
Finally, on day 4, all participants were tested again for their memory of
movies 1 and 2 (test 2).
that of the first movie (i.e., same room, computer, experimenter,
and experimental protocol). As in the encoding session on day 1,
the movie was presented three times, followed by a 40-question
test taxing memory for the movie’s occurrences.
Finally, on day 4, participants of both groups were re-tested for
their memory of both movies and provided corresponding con-
fidence ratings (test 2). Memory for the first episode was tested
before the second one. Once again, 40 questions were presented
for each movie, for which participants were to choose the cor-
rect answer out of four possible options. Each question in test 2
was matched to a corresponding question in test 1, both target-
ing the exact same detail in the movie at each of the two tests but
phrased somewhat differently. For example, test 1: “What is the
first question the interviewer asked Eran” (one of the interviewed
characters), test 2: “what is the first thing the interviewer said to
Eran?”. This was done in order to avoid the possibility that instead
of retrieving anew in test 2, participants would respond based on
their memory for the questions and/or corresponding answers of
test 1. Questions used for each of the two tests were assigned to
each test in a counter balanced manner.
DATA ANALYSIS
Memory tests included 40 questions, each with four possible
answers, only one of which was correct. Memory performance
for each participant was computed as the proportion of correct
responses in each questionnaire. Ourmain objective was to exam-
ine how post-reminder manipulations correspond to alterations
in memory performance before and after the manipulation. To
control for variability in baseline memory performance for test
1, administered immediately after encoding the first movie (see
Supplementary Material), we computed a memory strength score
for each participant, defined as the ratio between memory per-
formance on day 4 and day 1 (i.e., memory performance of
test2/test1), denoted as Mstr = M4/M1, where M1 and M4 refer
to memory performance on days 1 and 4, respectively. Note that
since questions could be answered incorrectly in test 1 and cor-
rectly in the corresponding matched (but different) questions in
test 2, memory strength scores higher than 1 are plausible. To cor-
roborate the above analysis, we computedmemory strength scores
in an additional way, by computing the difference in memory per-
formance on day 4 and day 1 instead of their ratio (differential
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memory strength). This analysis yielded very similar results, as
reported in the Supplementary Material Section (see Results and
Figure S1). For each group, average Mstr scores were calculated
and a subsequent One-Way ANOVA was carried out to test for
potential differences among groups.
FOK scores were computed for each participant as the aver-
age ratings of the 20 reminder responses. In order to examine
the relationship between FOK and memory strength scores or
between FOK and learning memory performance measured on
day 1 in test 1 within each group, we computed Pearson cor-
relations between these measures for each group separately. To
examine the differences between the groups’ FOK vs. memory
strength and FOK vs. pre-manipulation memory performance
correlation slopes, analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) tests were
performed to obtain a measure of the slope (β) for each group,
which were subsequently compared among groups to test for
differences in the slopes and intercepts of the regression lines
(i.e., group × slope interactions). Since FOK scores were given
in response to general retrieval cues targeting whole scenes and
the memory tests taxed specific scene details, specific FOK ratings
could not be attributed to particular memory items and directly
compared.
RESULTS
Testing for postulated reconsolidation effects among the three
groups regardless of metamemory judgments did not yield signif-
icant findings, as mean memory strength scores for movie 1 did
not differ among the three groups (Figure 2; One-Way ANOVA:
F(2, 74) = 0.75, p = 0.48). Thus, the absence of a reminder or the
timing of post-reminder new learning material, were not suffi-
cient to affect memory strength differences as assessed by average
group performance irrespective of FOK ratings.
The primary aim of this study was to examine the relationship
between metamemory evaluations of reminded information and
FIGURE 2 | Group means of memory strength. Mean memory strength,
calculated as the ratio of test2/test1, shown for each of the three groups
(Manipulation Group, Delayed Manipulation Group, and No Reminder
Group). No significant differences were found between the 3 groups
[One-Way ANOVA: F(2, 74) = 0.75, p = 0.48].
the memory’s susceptibility to post-reminder manipulations. We
thus inspected the relationship between the average FOK rating
of each of the participants measured upon reactivation of movie
1 and their corresponding memory strength scores. Specifically,
Pearson correlations were computed between FOK and mem-
ory strength scores across participants for each group separately
(Figures 3A,B). The Manipulation Group, which watched movie
2 immediately after the reminder-FOK assessment stage of movie
1, showed a negative correlation between memory strength and
FOK, so that the lower their FOK was, the higher was their final
memory strength score (rmanip = −0.38, p < 0.05, Figure 3A). In
other words, the lower the FOK ratings for reactivated memory
items, the less those memories were influenced by new learning
material. This was true, however, only when new information
was learned immediately after the reminder phase, as the Delayed
Manipulation Group, that underwent manipulation a day after
the reminder phase, displayed nomeaningful correlation between
FOK and memory strength (rdelay = 0.09, p = 0.69, Figure 3B).
An analysis of covariance test (ANCOVA) yielded a significant
difference between the slopes of these two groups (F(3, 53) =
4.02, p = 0.05) demonstrating a clear divergence in memory
performance vs. FOK correlations. Corroborating these results,
correlating the FOK scores with the difference memory strength
(i.e., calculating memory change by subtracting instead of divid-
ing test 2 from test 1 scores) yielded similar results (Manipulation
Group: rmanip = 0.38, p < 0.05, Delayed Manipulation Group:
rdelay = −0.05, p = 0.43; ANCOVA—F(3, 53) = 3.53, p = 0.06;
see Figures S1A,B).
To rule out the possibility that these correlations were not
related to the manipulation phase, we also measured the cor-
respondence between FOK judgments and original memory
performance (i.e., prior to the manipulation phase), by com-
puting the correlation between memory performance scores
of participants obtained at test 1 and corresponding FOK
assessments taken on day 2. As might be expected (Sacher
et al., 2009), memory performance and FOK assessments
(assessed prior to the presentation of movie 2) were posi-
tively correlated in both the Manipulation Group (r = 0.33, p =
0.055, Figure 3C) and Delayed Manipulation Group (r = 0.575,
p < 0.05; Figure 3D). Thus, prior to the manipulation phase
(i.e., before immediate or delayed post-retrieval presentation
of movie 2), no apparent differences were detected between
groups in the relationship between memory performance and
FOK (ANCOVA—F(3, 53) = 0.62, p = 0.43). Similarly, average
FOK ratings were not significantly different between the two
groups (Manipulation Group mean, SE: 76.8, 1.46%, Delayed
Manipulation Group: 80.5, 2.5%, t-test: p = 0.21). These find-
ings strengthen the notion that post-retrieval changes in
memory performance are influenced by metamemory assess-
ments upon reactivation and the timing of post-reminder
manipulation.
Taken together, these results demonstrate the involvement
of metamemory judgments in the long-term fate of reac-
tivated memories, so that the lower one’s FOK judgments
during reactivation, the lower the chances that immediate
learning of new information will degrade those reactivated
memories.
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FIGURE 3 | Inter-participant correlations between FOK and Memory
performance. (A) Scatterplot of memory strength vs. FOK for Manipulation
Group, where movie 2 was learned immediately after reactivation of movie 1.
The plot indicates a negative correlation between FOK and memory strength
(r = −0.38, p < 0.05). (B) Scatterplot of memory strength vs. FOK for the
Delayed Manipulation Group, for which movie 2 was learned 1 day after
reactivation of movie 1, demonstrating that memory strength is not
correlated with FOK levels (r = 0.09, p = 0.69). The correlation slopes
significantly differed between Manipulation Group and Delayed Manipulation
Group [ANCOVA F(3, 53) = 4.02, p = 0.05]. (C–D) Scatterplots of
pre-manipulation memory performance (test 1) vs. FOK for the Manipulation
Group (C) and Delayed Manipulation Group (D). Both groups exhibited
positive correlations between these two measures (Manipulation Group:
r = 0.33, p = 0.055; Delayed Manipulation Group: r = 0.575, p < 0.05). The
correlation slopes of Manipulation Group and Delayed Manipulation Group did
not differ from one another [ANCOVA F(3, 53) = 0.62, p = 0.43].
DISCUSSION
Our results demonstrate a role of metamemory processes in the
fate of long-term memories such that one’s perceived memory
strength during retrieval attempts of naturalistic episodes can pre-
dict whether and to what extent those memories might change.
Specifically, we show that the perceived memory availability of
a previously learned film (assessed by FOK ratings), if imme-
diately followed by acquisition of new material, is proportional
to long-term deterioration in memory performance. To construe
the relation between metamemory judgments—probed here by
FOK assessments—and the fate of long-term memory, it is useful
to appreciate what FOK assessments signify. Two leading models
that aim to explain FOK judgments are the cue-familiarity model
(Reder and Ritter, 1992) and the accessibility account (Koriat,
1993). The cue-familiarity model accounts for rapid preliminary
FOK, where the familiarity of the cue (or pointer), but not the
actual memory (target), serves as the basis for making FOK judg-
ments (Metcalfe et al., 1993). Accordingly, FOK judgments are
made by assessing the familiarity of presented information, which
is often, though not always, correlated with accurate memory
retrieval (Schnyer et al., 2004; Sacher et al., 2009; Hertzog et al.,
2010). The accessibility account of FOK states that metamemory
judgments are based on any partial available information rele-
vant to targeted items, not necessarily limited to those elicited
by the cue (Schacter and Worling, 1985; Koriat, 1993; Pannu and
Kaszniak, 2005).
A model that combines the cue-familiarity and accessibility
accounts (Koriat and Levy-Sadot, 2001), suggests that cues are
initially assessed for familiarity, whereby low familiarity can ter-
minate attempts to retrieve memory items, and high familiarity
will initiate further search of the targeted memory. This model
contends that monitoring and retrieval are two components of a
single process, during which FOK judgments can be formed based
on the overall availability of targeted items (Koriat, 1993, 1994).
FOK judgments are thus generated by the accumulation of correct
and incorrect partial information accessible during the monitor-
ing and retrieval process (Koriat, 1993, 1994), and are typically
positively correlated with memory accuracy (Koriat, 1994; Sacher
et al., 2009), a notion that coincides with our findings. Based on
the above, our working assumption is that FOK rates reflect the
extent of accessible information pertinent to the target memory.
As mentioned above, it was not merely the time-frame of
reminder-immediate new learning that engendered a change in
long-term memory strength, but also the extent of perceived
memory during the reminder phase. The lower the memory reac-
tivation of the original film—expressed by FOK ratings—the less
the immediate new learning affected its long-term retention. The
notion that among themanymemory traces that may be retrieved
at a given point, the highly reactivatedmemories are those that are
most susceptible to modifications resonates with previous animal
and human studies. In rodents and fish, the dominant associa-
tion that had more control over behavior out of those paired with
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a retrieval cue was the one that reconsolidated (Eisenberg et al.,
2003). A similar effect was recently observed for hippocampal-
dependent memory in humans, whereby newly presented visual
contexts were “bound” with previously learned items, yet only
when those items represented the dominant memory traces, indi-
cating that memory modification is related to the extent of
reactivation (Bridge and Voss, 2014). In a recent episodic memory
study in humans, items encoded during a museum tour that were
subjectively reported to be well remembered were more prone to
incorporation of false information presented during the reminder
phase than less recollected memories (St. Jacques and Schacter,
2013). This implies that although highly reactivated memories
are generally recalled accurately and vividly, they are also more
sensitive to post-retrieval manipulations. In line with the afore-
mentioned studies, we propose that the degree of FOK ratings
in response to retrieval cues, representing memory reactivation
levels, is one of the predictors of the memory’s susceptibility to
post-reactivation manipulation.
When considering the change in averagememory performance
for the content of the original movie, disregarding inter-subject
variations in metamemory ratings, our results showed no differ-
ence among all three groups. Thus, on average, all groups showed
a similar reduction in memory performance between initial and
final tests, whether they received a reminder that was immedi-
ately followed by a second learning phase (Manipulation Group),
underwent the new learning stage 1 day after the reminder
(DelayedManipulation group), or learned the new episode devoid
of a reminder (No Reminder group). That the reminder, postu-
lated to reactivate the cued memory, did not stimulate memory
facilitation (Gisquet-Verrier and Riccio, 2012) may be explained
by the fact that we provided a single reminder only, unlike
other studies that used either multiple reminders or stronger
ones as detailed below. For instance, it was demonstrated that
memory enhancement for paired syllables required at least two
consecutive cue reminders following the presentation of an initial
reminder (Forcato et al., 2011). In another study, three consecu-
tive reminders in the form of instructed retrieval of the learning
material, similar to the reminder phase in our paradigm, boosted
memory strength whereas a single retrieval reminder phase was
ineffective in enhancing memory performance (Wichert et al.,
2013). Memory facilitation was also shown to occur when using
more potent reminders than in our study in the form of amemory
test (Potts and Shanks, 2012). In addition, whereas the reminder
phase included general retrieval cues associated with the target
memory, reminders that facilitate memory might require sub-
stantial resemblance to the encoded material (St. Jacques and
Schacter, 2013).
An additional factor that may explain the lack of an over-
all average group reconsolidation effect in our study might be
the type of post-reminder manipulation used. Specifically, the
post-reminder learning material applied here did not pose direct
interference to the reminded material, as in some declarative
memory studies demonstrating reconsolidation. For example,
providing reminders to A-B pairs of previously learned non-
sense syllables, followed immediately by the encoding of a new
set of A-C syllable pairs, yielded higher error rates in the mem-
ory for the original list than those of control groups with either
delayed or no interference (Forcato et al., 2007). A similar effect
was found for memory of lists of objects, whereby providing a
reminder for the original list immediately before learning a new
object list, increased intrusions of new items (Hupbach et al.,
2007). Tampering with long-term episodic memory of a movie
was achieved by presenting false information related to the orig-
inally encoded material immediately after reactivating it (Chan
and LaPaglia, 2013). Introducing interfering information dur-
ing the postulated malleable state does not however seem to
be a pre-requisite for reconsolidation, as encoding new post-
reminder information unrelated to the original material can also
lead to its reconsolidation (Schwabe andWolf, 2009). A study that
tested boundary reconsolidation conditions of declarative mem-
ories in humans reported weak or null reconsolidation effects
in a reactivation-interference protocol using sets of pictures as
memoranda (Wichert et al., 2011). Importantly, similar to our
paradigm, the post-reminder learning material in that study did
not pose a direct interference to the original information, a
fact that might explain the weak or lack of group reconsolida-
tion effects. All considered, it is possible that had we presented
post-reminder learning material that directly interfered with the
memory of the original film, a more robust reconsolidation effect
may have been set in motion regardless of the extent of memory
reactivation.
To summarize, we show that the subjective degree of episodic
memory reactivation may determine, under conditions that are
postulated to favor reconsolidation, the long-term fate of those
memory representations. This finding extends the current view
regarding the conditions assumed to promote reconsolidation
of long-term naturalistic memories, suggesting a significant role
for the retriever’s perception of the memory’s accessibility on
its final outcome. These findings could be taken into considera-
tion in reconsolidation protocols in which altering memory, and
particularly of episodic nature, is desirable.
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